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Amartya Sen’s capability approach has the potential to counter neoliberal 
critiques of social welfare systems by overcoming the false opposition between 
security and flexibility.  In particular, it can be used to promote the idea of social 
rights as the foundation of active participation by individuals in the labour 
market.  This idea is starting to be reflected in the case law of the European 
Court of Justice concerning free movement of persons but its use in the 
European employment strategy is so far more limited, thanks to the continuing 
influence of neoliberal ‘activation policies’. 
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The concept of  ‘capability’, developed by Amartya Sen in a series of economic 
and philosophical texts,
1 could play a major role in the reshaping of the 
European Union’s social and employment policies.  The prominence of the 
capability concept in contemporary European debates owes much to the use 
made of it in the report on the Transformation of Work and the Future of Labour 
Law in Europe which was prepared for the European Commission by a group 
led by Alain Supiot.
2  The Supiot Report argued that a capability-based 
approach would help to overcome the opposition between ‘security’ and 
‘flexibility’ which had been established in neoliberal critiques of labour law and 
the welfare state, and provide a basis for ‘real freedom of choice’ in relation to 
labour market participation.  This analysis was further developed in a paper 
published in Droit Social by the economist Robert Salais, one of the members of 
the Supiot group.
3  A research programme was subsequently initiated, designed 
among other things to explore the potential role of a new ‘politics of 
capabilities’ within the wider project of European integration.
4   
 
The present paper aims to contribute to that programme of research by exploring 
some of the legal aspects of the capability concept.  There is no precise juridical 
equivalent to Sen’s notion of ‘capability’.  However, certain legal concepts 
undoubtedly bear a certain resemblance to it.  This is particularly true of notions 
of contractual capacity which are recognized in both common law and civilian 
systems of private law.  The task of exploring the links between ‘capability’ and 
legal ‘capacity’ has begun.
5  My aim here is to focus on a different strand of 
legal thought, namely the set of ideas associated with the duty to work in labour 
and social security law.  The content of the duty to work has shifted over time 
according to different notions of the capacity or ability of individuals to make 
themselves available for employment.  These in turn have been shaped by 
particular conceptions of the employment relationship and of the family.  To see 
how this process has occurred is to gain some insight into how the capability 
concept might operate if, as its proponents intend, it comes to serve as a new 
conceptual cornerstone for social law. 
 
To this end, section 2 below explores Sen’s definition of ‘capability’ and the use 
made of the notion in the Supiot report.  Section 3 then looks at the historical 
development of legal analogues of capability in the English poor law and law of 
social insurance.  Section 4 returns the debate to a European level by considers 
some ways in which the capability concept is being (or could be) operationalised 






2.  Sen’s notion of capability and its adaptation in the Supiot report 
 
Sen’s account of capabilities describes individual well being in terms of a 
person’s ability to achieve a given set of functionings.  In this context,  
 
‘the ‘concept of  “functionings”… reflects the various things a 
person may value doing or being.  The valued functionings may 
vary from elementary ones, such as being adequately nourished and 
being free from avoidable disease, to very complex activities or 
personal states, such as being able to take part in the life of the 
community and having self-respect… A “capability” [is] a kind of 
freedom: the substantive freedom to achieve alternative functioning 
combinations.’
6   
 
An individual’s feasible set of utilization functions is constrained by the limits 
upon their own resources.  This is not simply a question of choice. Non-choice 
factors affect functioning; for example, an individual’s metabolic rate which is a 
consequence of their physical state. The state of an individual’s knowledge may 
also be a non-choice factor, although this can be improved by education. Here 
the element of choice may lie elsewhere, at the collective or societal level, that is 
to say, with policy makers, government officials, and judges. Apart from the 
resources available to an individual, their capability to make use of a commodity 
may depend upon access to a legal system which recognizes and guarantees 
protection of contract and property rights, but also upon access to health care, 
education and other resources which equip them to enter into relations of 
exchange with others.  Thus an individual’s capability is to some degree a 
consequence of their entitlements, that is, their ability to possess, control and 
extract benefits from a particular economic commodity or resource.   
 
Thus pivotal within Sen’s ‘capability approach’ is the idea of conversion factors.  
These are the characteristics of an individual’s person, their society and their 
environment which together determine their capability to achieve a given range 
of functionings.  Personal characteristics, in this sense could include an 
individual’s metabolism, or their biological sex, and environmental 
characteristics could refer to climate, physical surroundings, or technological 
infrastructure. But in addition, institutional or societal characteristics would 
include social norms, legal rules and public policies.  These can act to entrench 
inequality of capability, as is the case with social norms which result in 
institutionalised racial discrimination or gender stereotyping, or, conversely, to 
offset inequality through legal interventions of various kinds, including anti-





Sen has not sought to develop a juridical theory which might give some 
institutional shape to the capability concept, beyond insisting that his ‘capability 
approach’ does not prescribe any particular set of outcomes for a given society 
or group of societies.  The high level of generality and theoretical abstraction of 
the capability approach lends itself to adaptations which may be far from Sen’s 
initial formulation; the Supiot report is perhaps best thought of in this way.  In 
the Supiot report, the capability concept appears in the context of a discussion of 
the meaning of labour flexibility.
7  The report notes that ‘flexibility’ is 
frequently associated with greater variability in the application of social 
protection and labour standards, and thereby appears to be opposed to ‘security’.  
However, this view, it is argued, overlooks the degree to which the capabilities 
of an individual depend on them having access to the means they need to realize 
their life goals.  These include guarantees of a certain minimum standard of 
living and the resources needed to maintain an ‘active security’ in the face of 
economic and social risks, such as those arising from technological change and 
uncertainty in labour and product markets.  Thus ‘real freedom of action’ for 
entrepreneurs, in the form of protection of property rights and recognition of 
managerial prerogative, has its equivalent in guarantees for the development of 
human resources for workers.  However, these, the report suggests, would not 
necessarily take the same form as the ‘passive protections’ traditionally 
provided, in twentieth century welfare states, against unemployment and other 
interruptions to earnings.  ‘Protection against’ social risks is not the same as 
mechanisms aimed to maintain ‘security in the face of’ risks:  
 
We can understand the fundamental difference between protection, 
on the one hand, and security in the face of risks, on the other, by 
seeing that the latter includes but goes beyond the former.  The 
capacity to work flexibly is conditional upon being able to deal 
with the consequences of risks.  Protective regulations, because of 
the essentially negative way in which they are formulated, go 
against this kind of learning process.  Security in the face of risk, 
on the other hand, is about providing the individual with the means 
to anticipate, at any given moment, long-term needs… Thus 
guarantees of minimum living standards (for example, that each 
person should have an effective right to housing, and not just to a 
minimum income), far from being undermined by the need for 
flexibility, should be reinforced by virtue of this need, and, if 
anything, more clearly and concretely defined as a result.
8 
 
Phrased in this way, the capability concept can be understood as an answer, of 
sorts, to the neoliberal critique of labour and social security law.  That holds, 




upsets the process of mutual learning and adjustment which is implicit in market 
relations.  As Hayek put it, private law is the precondition of the market order in 
the sense that without it, individuals are not free to use their own information and 
knowledge for their own purposes.  Private law is certainly a product of 
governmental action: ‘in most circumstances the organisation which we call 
government becomes indispensable to assure that those rules are obeyed’.
9  
However, legal coercion to enforce contract and property rights is justified ‘where 
this is necessary to secure the private domain of the individual against 
interference by others’.
10  By contrast, public or regulatory law, which Hayek 
regarded as consisting of specific commands and directions aimed at the 
substantive redistribution of resources, introduces an illegitimate form of 
interference  by the state.  Where this occurs, the ‘spontaneous order’ of the 
market is upset, and a certain part of the advantages to individuals and society 
alike of a market order, in terms of a higher degree of specialization and a more 
extensive division of labour, are lost.   
 
The capability approach offers a response, based on the market-creating function 
of the rules of social law.  In order to participate effectively in a market order, 
individuals require more than formal access to the institutions of property and 
contract.  They need to be provided with the economic means to realize their 
potential: these include social guarantees of housing, education and training, as 
well as legal institutions which prescribe institutionalized discrimination.   
Mechanisms of this kind, by extending labour market participation on the part of 




If the capability approach attempts to answer, at a certain theoretical level, some 
aspects of the neoliberal critique, it also moves beyond the conceptualization of 
social rights in the post-1945 welfare state.  T.H. Marshall, perhaps the most 
articulate exponent of this tradition, saw social rights as operating in tension 
with market relations.  Civil and political rights had ‘harmonized with the 
individualistic phase of capitalism’ in the nineteenth century.
12  By contras t, 
social rights, which Marshall defined as ranging ‘from the right to a modicum of 
economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social 
heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards 
prevailing in society’,
13 created entitlements which were ‘not proportionate to 
the market value of the claimant’.  Marshall, it is true, made something of an 
exception in this respect for collective bargaining, which he thought was ‘a 
normal peaceful market operation’ which also gave expression to ‘the right of 
the citizen to a minimum standard of civilized living’.
14  But for the most part, 
social rights were in  ‘basic conflict’ with the market.





The capability approach, by contrast, sees one of the principal purposes of social 
legislation and social rights as encouraging the participation of individuals in the 
labour market.  It is only by putting in place effective mechanisms for dealing 
with the effects upon individuals of economic uncertainty that the legitimacy 
and effectiveness of the market order can be maintained.  This is not necessarily 
a call for the individualization of labour law; the ‘conversion factors’ by which 
individual capabilities are enhanced are likely to be collective in nature.
16  But in 
the passage from ‘passive protection’ to ‘active security’,
17 it is likely that many 
features of existing welfare state and labour law systems would not survive 
unscathed. 
 
The capability approach to labour and social security law appears particularly 
novel when set against the post-1945 paradigm of protection based around 
‘stable employment for an adult male able to provide, by these means, for the 
needs of a nuclear family’.
18  That model makes certain assumptions about 
employment and family relations which no longer command general assent, and 
perhaps never did.  However, the ‘standard employment contract’ was itself a 
reaction to a quite different view of the conditions under which individuals 
should make themselves available for waged work. 
 
3.  The prehistory of the capability concept: notions of ability to work in the 
English poor law and social insurance  
 
The English ‘poor law’ was the precursor not just of the welfare state but of 
modern employment policy.  In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the ‘poor’ 
were not simply those with a low income, but all who were dependent on wages 
from employment as their principal means of subsistence: ‘those who labour to 
live, and such as are old and decrepit, unable to work, poor widows, and fatherless 
children, and tenants driven to poverty; not by riot, expense and carelessness, but 
by mischance’.
19  The poor law was, in one sense, a survivor of feudalism; as T.H. 
Marshall put it, ‘as the pattern of the old order dissolved under the blows of a 
competitive economy… the Poor Law was left high and dry as an isolated survival 
from which the idea of social rights was gradually drained away’.
20  However, 
there was another sense in which the poor law was a response to the emergence of 
a labour market.  The enactment of legislation dealing with wage rates, poor relief 
and labour mobility (or, as it was put, ‘vagrancy’) from the fourteenth century 
onwards is evidence how far traditional feudal ties based on obligatory service 
(villeinage or serfdom) had already declined by that point.   
 
Under the poor law, relief was delivered locally, through parishes (small 
administrative units covering only a few square miles), but organized nationally, in 




was required to set a local tax to be paid by householders (a ‘poor rate’), to 
suppress indiscriminate giving, and to organize in its place a regular system of 
welfare support.
21  Legislation called for the unemployed to be set to work, but the 
cost of implementing this provision was found to be excessive, and only a 
minority of parishes constructed workhouses for the purpose; for the most part, 
those suffering destitution for lack of work received cash doles (‘outdoor relief’) in 
the same way as the sick and the aged.  Local poor law officers were required to 
provide relief to all those with a settlement in the parish in question.  Thus relief 
became, in a customary sense, if not necessarily in the modern legal sense of a 
justiciable entitlement, the ‘peculiar privilege’ of the rural poor.
22   
 
One of the principal means of acquiring a settlement, from the late seventeenth 
century, was through a yearly hiring, which was the normal form of employment 
for young, unmarried workers in agriculture.  The young thereby had an incentive 
to leave their home parish to search for employment elsewhere, acquiring a 
settlement in return for annual service as they moved from one employer to 
another, thereby ensuring that they would not be subject to removal to their parish 
of origin.  In this way, the poor law, along with the emerging notion of the contract 
of service, encouraged and supported labour mobility.
23   
 
The second half of the eighteenth century saw falling real wages in agriculture at 
the same time as access to the land was restricted by enclosure.
24  The social 
upheaval which accompanied the depopulation of rural areas was matched by a 
similarly far-reaching process of transformation in the poor law and labour 
legislation.  The response of those charged with the administration of the poor law 
to falling real incomes in agriculture in the 1790s was the institution of a practice 
of wage supplementation, known as the Speenhamland system after the rural 
district in which it was first adopted.  It began as an ad hoc addition of poor relief 
to wages, designed to bring incomes up to subsistence level.  At the same time, 
attempts to deal with the problem through the implementation of a minimum wage 
(through the revival of the wage fixing powers of the Elizabethan Statute of 
Artificers) were rejected both locally and in the national parliament.
25 The 
combined effect was to relieve employers of the obligation to pay the customary 
level of wages; during the same period, yearly hirings were becoming increasingly 
uncommon,
26 and changes to the law of settlement made it more difficult for wage 
earners and their dependants to acquire the right to relief.
27   As employment grew 
less stable and access to relief by the traditional route of the settlement by hiring, 
under which the employer absorbed the costs of short-term interruptions to 
earnings, became increasingly restricted, expenditure on poor relief grew to the 
point where a national debate was launched on the feasibility of maintaining the 
poor law system.  This continued, at intervals, over several decades in the early 




steadily more restrictive and punitive.  This process culminated in the 1834 Poor 
Law Report
28 and the Poor Law (Amendment) Act
29 of the same year. 
 
The new poor law which was put in place after 1834 was founded on the principle 
of ‘less eligibility’, meaning that relief should not provide a standard of living 
superior to that enjoyed by the least-well off  ‘independent’ household.  The 
assumption was that once the ‘distortion’ of wage supplementation was removed, 
wages would rise to the point where the subsistence needs could be met.  On this 
basis, the unwillingness of individuals to accept wages set by the market could 
only be evidence of poor ‘character’, which it was the role of the law to address by 
disciplinary means.  Thus a wilful refusal to accept an offer of employment at the 
going rate of wages became a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment.
30  At 
this point, in the absence of a minimum wage and before the development of 
collective bargaining, the relevant wage was whatever an employer was willing to 
offer, and not the customary rate for that trade.  In addition, the simple fact of 
destitution as a result of unemployment or sickness would normally lead to the 
confinement in the workhouse of the wage earner and other family members.
31  
Beginning in the 1840s, a series of regulatory orders spelled out the implications 
of this policy for the administration of poor relief: outdoor relief was to be limited 
as far as possible to the aged and infirm, denied to the adult ‘able bodied’, and 
under no circumstances combined with wages; if it were to be paid, exceptionally, 
to those who were able to work, it had to be combined with a ‘labour test’ 
designed to deter the work shy; and in order to ensure that conditions inside the 
workhouse were, as far as possible, below those of the worst-off household 




In this context, being able to work was defined as having the physical capacity to 
labour, and the labour test functioned to distinguish the work-shy from those 
genuinely incapable of working.  But of course, physical ability to work was only 
one aspect of being ‘able bodied’.  A further, implicit assumption was that the 
claimant for relief had no means of their own; that they were propertyless.  
Capability, then, was a function of the duty to work which was imposed on those 
with no means of subsistence but their own capacity to labour.  The independently 
wealthy were not subject to the duty to work.   
 
Bentham recognized, and implicitly endorsed, the dual standard at work here.  The 
old poor law, he complained, had ceased to draw an appropriate distinction 
between ‘natural’ poverty, which the law could not hope to relieve, and the ‘evil’ 
of indigence.  By enabling ‘the condition of persons maintained without property 
by the labour of others [to be] rendered more eligible than that of persons 




upon which the market depended for its effectiveness: ‘individuals destitute of 
property would be continually withdrawing themselves from the class of persons 
maintained by their own labour, to the class of persons maintained by the labour of 
others; and the sort of idleness, which at present is more or less confined to 
persons of independent fortune, would thus extend itself sooner or later to every 
individual… till at last there would be nobody left to labour at all for anybody’ 
(emphasis added).
33  It was because the numbers of the propertyless greatly 
outweighed those of the idle (or ‘independent’) rich that the law had to coerce the 
former into employment, while leaving the latter to enjoy their ‘fortune’ 
undisturbed. 
 
Just as the new poor law was a response to the perceived failings of 
Speenhamland, so the welfare state of the twentieth century was constructed by 
way of reaction against what were seen as the shortcomings of the system put in 
place after 1834.  By the end of the nineteenth century, there was a growing 
consensus that the new poor law had failed in its own terms.  Wages had risen 
following the restriction of outdoor relief, but not to the extent which had been 
anticipated.  Destitution was an ever-present phenomenon in Britain’s major urban 
areas and in many rural districts.  When numbers of the unemployed increased, as 
they did in particular during the long recession which lasted from the 1870s to the 
1890s, the response of the poor law administrators was to tighten the disciplinary 
operation of the system; outdoor relief was made more selective, the labour test 
more severe, and workhouse conditions made more demeaning.   Thus throughout 
the 1880s and 1890s, a number of urban poor law unions were constructing special 
‘test workhouses’ with the aim of subjecting the adult able-bodied to a particularly 
stringent regime of discipline.
34   
 
The sheer expense of this effort was one factor which helped to turn the tide of 
opinion; also important was the work of the ‘social science’ movement which set 
out to measure the extent of destitution outside the poor law system.   
‘Independent’ households could not subsist on the wages offered for low-paid 
work, and were reliant in practice on ad-hoc charitable giving; the casualisation of 
urban occupations undermined efforts to establish a living wage and imposed 
unnecessary search costs on employers and workers alike.
35   
 
A key text in laying bare the deficiencies of the new poor law was the Minority 
Report of the Poor Law Commission of 1909, which was drafted by Sidney and 
Beatrice Webb.  For the Webbs, the new poor law was constructed on a false 
premise, namely that destitution was always and everywhere the result of 
personal irresponsibility.  This, in turn, was the result in turn of the undue 
attention placed in 1834 on ‘one plague spot – the demoralization of character 





36  The Webbs did not believe that the ‘personal character’ of those in 
poverty was completely irrelevant; it was ‘of vital importance to the method of 
treatment to be adopted with regard to the individuals in distress’.  However, it 




As Beveridge had put it, unemployment was ‘a problem of industry’, that is, a 
feature of economic organization, rather than the result of personal 
irresponsibility.  His research on casualisation
38 was called in aid to show that 
‘chronic over supply of casual labour in relation to the local demand was 
produced and continued, irrespective of any excess of population or depression 
of trade, by the method by which employers engaged their casual workers’ 
(emphasis in original).  This ‘inevitably creates and perpetuates what have been 
called “stagnant pools” of labour in which there is nearly always some reserve 
of labour left, however great may be the employer’s demand’.
39  It was 
continued exposure to the effects of under-employment which precipitated 
decline into the permanently unemployed, a body which, leaving aside ‘the rare 
figure of the ruined baronet or clergyman’ consisted of ‘those Unemployables 
who represent the wastage from the manual, wage earning class’.
40   
 
To this, the Webbs added an important rider: the effects of casualisation were 
exacerbated by the poor law itself.  The outdoor labour test, by providing 
intermittent work for the unemployed, ‘facilitates and encourages the worst kind 
of Under-employment, namely, the unorganized, intermittent jobs of the casual 
labourer’.  Likewise, the workhouse test for the able-bodied, by ‘establishing a 
worse state of things for its inmates than is provided by the least eligible 
employment outside’, not only engendered ‘deliberate cruelty and degradation, 
thereby manufacturing and hardening the very class it seeks to exterminate’; it 
also ‘protects and, so to speak, standardizes the worst conditions of commercial 
employment’.
41  Thus the ‘fatal ambiguity’
42 of ‘less eligibility’ was that 
standards inside and outside the workhouse, since they were mutually 
reinforcing, would drive each other down, until ‘the premises, the sleeping 
accommodation, the food and the amount of work exacted, taken together, 
constitute a treatment more penal and more brutalizing than that of any gaol in 
England’.
43   
 
The solutions advanced by the Minority Report reflected its diagnosis of the 
problem.  Their principal aim was to remove the ‘able-bodied’ from the reach of 
the poor law.  The key mechanisms for achieving this end were labour 
exchanges which, in addition to reducing search costs, would break the power 





What a National Labour Exchange could remedy would be the 
habit of each employer of keeping around him his own reserve of 
labour.  By substituting one common reservoir, at any rate for the 
unspecialised labourers, we could drain the Stagnant Pools of 
Labour which this habit produces and perpetuates.
44 
 
The Minority Report also addressed the issue of unemployment compensation as 
an alternative to poor law relief.  It argued in favour of a hybrid public-private 
system, under which government would have the power to subsidise the private 
insurance schemes already run, at that point, by certain trade unions.  In the 
event, Part II of the National Insurance Act 1911 went further by instituting a 
fully state-administered system.  However, the form of unemployment 
compensation which initially emerged was similar to that discussed by the 
Minority Report, namely a system of compulsory insurance ‘applied only to 
particular sections of workers or to certain specified industries, under carefully 
considered conditions’.
45  This was gradually extended during the inter-war 
period to cover the vast majority of the workforce; a key feature of the system, 
and a significant departure from the poor law, was that workers were entitled for 
the most part to refuse work at wages below those which they had received in 
their previous employment, or which were out of line with standards set by 
collective agreements between employers’ associations and trade unions in the 
relevant district. 
 
In this respect, social insurance dovetailed with state support for labour 
standards.  The case for general legislative standards in the labour market was put 
by the Webbs in Industrial Democracy, the first edition of which appeared in 
1896.  Their ‘National Minimum’ of living and working conditions would ‘extend 
the conception of the Common Rule from the trade to whole community’.  Low-
paying and casualised trades were ‘parasitic’ as by paying wages below 
subsistence they received a subsidy from the rest of the community; thus ‘the 
enforcement of a common minimum standard throughout the trade not only stops 
the degradation, but in every way conduces to efficiency’.  In this respect, the 
deficiencies of the selective model of regulation contained in nineteenth century 
factory legislation were clearly recognised: 
 
  this policy of prescribing minimum conditions, below which no 
employer is allowed to drive even his most necessitous operatives, 
has yet been only imperfectly carried out.  Factory legislation applies, 
usually, only to sanitary conditions and, as regards particular classes, 
to the hours of labour.  Even within this limited sphere it is 
everywhere unsystematic and lop-sided.  When any European 




of the ‘sweated trades’ he will have to expand the Factory Acts of his 
country into a systematic and comprehensive Labour Code, 
prescribing the minimum conditions under which the community can 
afford to allow industry to be carried on; and including not merely 
definite precautions of sanitation and safety, and maximum hours of 
toil, but also a minimum of weekly earnings.
46 
 
A third component in the re-regulation of the labour market was provided by full 
employment policy.  In Beveridge’s view, an effective social insurance scheme 
could not work unless ‘employment is maintained, and mass unemployment 
prevented’.
47  The responsibility for providing the conditions for full 
employment lay with the state: ‘[i]t must be function of the State to defend the 
citizens against mass unemployment, as definitely as it is now the function of 
the State to defend the citizens against attack from abroad and against robbery 
and violence at home’.
48  Full employment, in turn, had a specific sense.  It did 
not just refer to the absence of unemployment, but to the availability of 
employment of a particular kind: ‘at fair wages, of such a kind, and so located 
that the unemployed men can reasonably be expected to take them; it means, by 
consequence, that the normal lag between losing one job and finding another 
will be very short’.
49  Beveridge’s combined scheme for social security and full 
employment therefore sought to complete the work of the Minority Report of 
1909 in reversing the effect of the poor law.  As he put it, ‘the labour market 
should always be a seller’s market rather than a buyer’s market’.
50   
 
The welfare state of the mid twentieth century therefore gave rise to a specific 
conception of social rights: a model of social citizenship based on employment.  
The duty to work was not completely neutralized.  On the contrary, access to 
economic security depended on labour market participation.  However, this was 
conditional upon the capacity of the state, through a combination of regulation 
and macroeconomic management, to guarantee access to stable and well 
remunerated employment, and to provide for collective provision against the 
principal hazards for wage earners in a market economy, in particular 
unemployment, illness and old age.  Encoded in the complex mass of detail of 
national insurance legislation was a commitment to social integration and 
solidarity across different occupational groups: ‘[w]orkers of every grade in 
every town and village in the country are now banded together in mutual State-




There were qualifications to this idea, the most important of which was the 
differential treatment of male and female workers.  Beveridge’s social insurance 




allowed them to opt out of most aspects of the scheme; in return they were able 
to claim the long-term benefits of retirement and widows’ pension on the basis 
of their husbands’ contributions.  As a result of decisions taken in the 1940s, a 
high proportion of married women either stayed outside the national insurance 
scheme altogether or opted to pay a lower rate, up to the late 1970s.
52   
 
The roots of the differential treatment of men and women in social insurance 
systems are to be found in contemporary assumptions about the family and the 
employment relationship.  This is most clearly seen in the extensive discussion 
by the Webbs, in the 1909 Minority Report, of the question, ‘are women able-
bodied?’   
 
The new category of ‘unemployment’ differed from the concept of ‘able-
bodiedness’ in the way it carefully defined the status of the applicant for relief 
by reference to the employment which had been lost and to which the applicant 
was expected to return: as the Minority Report recognised in referring to the 
intentions of the Unemployed Workmen Act 1905, the ‘bona fide Unemployed’ 
were ‘the men and women who, having been in full work at full wages, find 
themselves without employment through no fault of their own’ (emphasis 
added).
53  This category, in the view of the authors of the Report, necessarily 
excluded women whose domestic responsibilities prevented them from 
becoming ‘regular and efficient recruits of the industrial army’.
54   Thus in 
response to the questions ‘are women able-bodied?’, posed at the beginning of 
the Report, and ‘are women unemployed?’, posed at the end, the same answer 
was supplied: only if they were ‘unencumbered independent wage earners, both 




The logical conclusion was the male breadwinner wage: 
 
we have chosen so to organise our industry that it is to the man that 
is paid the income necessary for the support of the family, on the 
assumption that the work of the woman is to care for the home and 
the children.  The result is that mothers of young children, if they 
seek industrial employment, do so under the double disadvantage 
that the woman’s wage is fixed to maintain herself alone, and that 
even this can be earned only by giving up to work the time that is 
needed by the care of the children.  When the bread-winner is 
withdrawn by death or desertion, or is, from illness or 
Unemployment, unable to earn the family maintenance, the bargain 
which the community made with the woman on her marriage – that 




broken.  It seems to us clear that, if only for the sake of the interest 
which the community has in the children, there should be adequate 
provision made from public funds for the maintenance of the home, 
conditional on the mother’s abstaining from industrial work, and 
devoting herself to the care of the children.
56  
 
In this way, the welfare state was constructed on a notion of ability to work 
which presupposed a particular family structure. 
 
4. Contemporary European social and employment policy from a capability 
perspective 
 
In the post-war welfare state, the duty to work was qualified by state guarantees 
of full employment and by access to a breadwinner wage, underpinned by 
collective bargaining.  The decline of the breadwinner wage, which has 
accelerated since the 1970s, is a complex phenomenon.
57  On the one hand, 
increasing female participation in paid employment, coupled with the growing 
importance of sex discrimination and equal pay legislation, has eroded the 
assumption that well-paid, secure and stable jobs should be reserved for male 
earners.  On the other, the notion of a breadwinner wage is of declining 
relevance for the increasing proportion of households with children which 
contain a single parent, normally the mother (up from 7% of all such households 
in 1971 to 21% by 1994
58).  Both trends are particularly visible in the UK, but 
also illustrate the range of forces involved.   
 
Thus overall participation rates for married women have increased markedly, 
from 10% in 1931 (this low figure influenced Beveridge to believe that married 
women should be a special class of contributors to national insurance) to 22% in 
1951, 42% in 1971 and 53% in 1971.  However, this growth has increasingly 
taken the form of part-time work: in 1971 this accounted for one third of all 
female employment, but by 2001 had reached almost half of the total.
59  An 
unduly large proportion of female part-timers are employed on very low weekly 
wages, in part because of an artificial fiscal subsidy which until recently applied 
to employment below the level of national insurance contributions.
60  
 
In general, and notwithstanding attempts to legislate for equality of treatment,
61 
part-time work still confers relatively lower incomes and proportionately fewer 
employment-related benefits than is the case with full-time work.  There has 
been a narrowing of the gender pay gap and average job tenure rates for women 
have been lengthening at the same time as those of men have been falling.   




substantial reduction in wage inequality between men and women, and the 
longer job tenure of women was the result in part of the passage of maternity 
protection legislation, mandating a period of maternity leave and providing for 
the right to return to employment.  However, these gains are largely 
concentrated on the situation of full-time working women; in the 1990s, while 
the gender pay gap was falling in overall terms, it remained constant for part-
time work.  Thus notwithstanding the elimination of discrimination against part-
time workers in relation to terms and conditions of employment and access to 
occupational pension schemes, part-time work remains poorly paid in relation to 
full-time employment.
62   
 
Conversely, the rise in single-parent households, while undermining the idea 
that it is necessarily a male earner’s duty to provide for the other family 
members, has been accompanied by a growing polarization of income and 
opportunities: while dual-earner households have been growing in number, an 
increasing proportion of households are without employment altogether.  In 
2002, of those households with married or cohabiting couples between the ages 
of 25 and 49, around one third had two full-time earners and a further third had a 
full-time male earner and a part-time female earner.  Less than 20% had a sole 
male breadwinner, around 4% had a sole female breadwinner, and around 6% of 
this age group had neither partner in work.  At the same time, the division of 
household tasks between men and women remains unequal.  This is so across all 
households, including those with two full-time earners and even those with sole 
female breadwinners, but it is particularly marked for households with part-time 
female earners and for those solely dependent on a male breadwinner.
63     
 
The overall effect is that ‘the erosion of the [male breadwinner family wage] has 
been only partial and has been accompanied by a number of interrelated 
problems, including increasing polarization between households, greater 
poverty, an uneven distribution of opportunities between households and 
difficulties in combining paid work with childcare’.
64  The principle of family 
subsistence no longer guarantees access to a living wage; instead, low pay is 
topped up with fiscal subsidies (tax credits), avoiding the ‘burden’ of regulation 
of employment.
65  In turn, the absence of a living wage is no longer, as it was at 
various points in the evolution of social insurance system, a good ground for 
refusing an offer of employment.
66  The withdrawal of benefits from the 
unemployed, now termed ‘jobseekers’, who refuse work on the grounds of its 
unsuitability or low level of remuneration is a policy which successive 
governments, Conservative and Labour, have followed during the 1990s.
67  Nor 
are lone parents completely exempt from the duty to work; although they cannot 




attend periodic interviews with an employment adviser, on pain of losing part of 
their social security entitlements.
68 
 
This is the background, at least in the UK, against which the capability debate is 
currently being played out: a neoliberal-inspired activation policy, which is in 
many respects the polar opposite of the policy of full employment which it has 
replaced.  Full employment, in its classic, Beveridgian sense, implied a set of 
measures to control and stabilize the labour supply.
69  The policy of ‘a high 
employment rate’, by contrast, aims to increase numbers in employment even if 
this is carried out at the cost of creating categories of low paid and ‘flexible’ 
work which do not provide access to a living wage.  Deregulation of terms and 
conditions of employment goes hand in hand with the restriction of the 
conditions under which social security benefits are made available.  For the time 
being, contemporary policy is closer to the old, pre-1834 poor law, in the use 
being made of tax credits and other forms of wage subsidisation which echo 
Speenhamland, than it is to the late Victorian institutionalisation of the 
workhouse and labour yard.  Yet it was precisely the same combination of rising 
expenditure and the use of poor relief to subsidise low wages which prompted 




The UK is, from one point of view, something of a special case within the 
European Union.  Other systems, in particular the Nordic countries, appear to 
have been more successful in replacing the male breadwinner model with 
alternatives based on an equitable household division of labour, regulation of 
working time aimed at achieving a more effective balance between working 
time and family time, and the use of active labour market policy measures to 
support transitions into paid employment.
71  However, while this model exists 
within certain Member States, it is striking that, to date, the European Union has 
done little to propagate it. 
 
This is the consequence, first of all, of the restricted scope for harmonization of 
social security law at European level.  In lieu of harmonization, the Treaty of 
Rome provided for the limited alternative of the coordination of social security 
systems.  In the traditional meaning of this term (prior to its use as part of the 
‘open method of coordination’ or OMC), coordination referred to measures 
designed to ensure that in moving between different social insurance regimes, 
migrant workers were not unduly penalized by comparison those whose 
employment remained within a single Member State.
72  Far from seeking to set a 
common standard for social security across different national regimes, it 
presupposed difference between them.  Notwithstanding the far-reaching 




remains an area in which the organs of the Community have very little capacity 
to act, as opposed to reacting to the effects of national diversity. 
 
The inability of the European Union to take the initiative in this area also results 
from the approach which has been adopted to the implementation of the 
employment strategy.  A full assessment of the use of the OMC in the context of 
employment is beyond the scope of the present paper.  However, 
notwithstanding the attention justifiably devoted to the OMC as a novel 
technique of regulatory learning, it is looking less likely over time that it can 
serve as a viable means for implementing a progressive policy agenda, in 
particular one of the kind set out by the Supiot report.  This is because the 
employment strategy bears the traces of its origin in the early and mid-1990s, at 
a series of European summits which set out the goals of counter-inflation policy 
and macroeconomic stability which accompanied the adoption of the single 
currency.
73  This accounts for the emphasis within the employment strategy 
upon the promotion of labour flexibility and the reduction of social security 
expenditure, themes which have led the Commission to give negative 
evaluations of the employment record of the Nordic systems while leaving the 
UK’s neoliberal approach relatively free of criticism.
74  The ‘learning process’ 
encouraged by the employment strategy is, at least for the time being, skewed 
towards neoliberal policy objectives; as such it is a potential force for the kind of 
deregulatory competition between European welfare states which has been long 
debated but, until now, has been limited in its impact.
75 
 
Against this rather unpromising background, what are the prospects for the 
capability approach as the foundation of a new conceptual framework in labour 
and social security law?  The ‘prehistory’ of the concept of capability suggests 
the need for care here.  For most of the period of the poor law, notions of ‘able-
bodiedness’ were derived from the existence of a duty to work which the law 
imposed on the propertyless.  Social insurance carved out a limited series of 
exceptions to this principle, based on a model of the breadwinner wage which 
now lacks legitimacy.   Is it possible to see in the concept of capability a basis 
for reversing the logic of the poor law and reinventing the welfare state, so that 
the duty to work is only imposed under circumstances where the state has 
provided the conditions under which individuals are equipped for effective 
labour market participation?  Simply to state this proposition in such terms is to 
see how far removed today’s mainstream debate is from any such conception of 
capability. 
 
The capability approach may nevertheless be helpful in providing a particular way 
of thinking about social rights with respect to market processes.  The purpose of 




put it, ‘[i]t is not clear that there is any royal road to evaluation of economic or 
social policies’.
76   This insistence that there is no universally-applicable, 
prescriptive list of functionings and capabilities means that attention is focused 
instead on social choice procedures by which the content of capability sets can 
be collectively determined in particular contexts.   
 
In the context of social welfare, the capability approach suggests a particular way 
of thinking about social rights: either as claims to resources, such as social security 
payments, or as rights to take part in forms of procedural or institutionalised 
interactions, such as those arising out of collective bargaining.  When social rights 
take the form of claims on resources, they are the equivalent of commodities 
which individuals can convert into potential or actual functionings.  When they 
take the form of proceduralised rights, they come close to what Sen calls ‘social 
conversion factors’, that is, social or institutional settings which shape the set of 
possibilities open to individuals in terms of achieving their goals.  Social rights 
shape the institutional environment in such a way as to enable all (or more) 
individuals to convert endowments in the form of human and physical assets into 
positive outcomes.   
 
Juridical support for the idea is beginning to appear in the interstices of 
European Union social welfare law.  One illustration of this is the parity 
accorded to social and economic rights in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, adopted in 2000.
77  Whatever the limitations of particular 
provisions of the Charter (and there is evidence that they diluted in the drafting 
process), the equivalence accorded to the rights contained in the ‘Equality’ and 
‘Solidarity’ chapters on the one hand, and those dealing with economic and 
political rights on the other, marks an important departure from the practice of 
subordinating social rights to economic considerations, which is to be found, for 
example, in the relationship between the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Freedoms and the European Social Charter, and arguably in the 
Treaty of Rome and its various successors.  The significance of this move is 
reflected in the determined (but so far unsuccessful) effort made to restore the 




A second source of institutional support for the capability approach may be 
found in the developing case law of the European Court of Justice on the 
concept of solidarity.  As Catherine Barnard explains, this idea is underpinned 
by  
 
the notion that the ties which exist between the individuals of a 




and positive – to ensure that the individual is integrated into the 
community where they have the chance to participate and 
contribute fully. The negative steps include removing obstacles to 
integration and participation; positive steps include active 
programmes to encourage participation of those otherwise 
excluded. If this reading is correct then the use of solidarity as a 
guiding principle can help liberate decision-makers and decision-
takers from the straitjacket of formal equal treatment.
79 
 
The claim that participation in a market presupposes active measures of 
integration, and not simply the removal of formal obstacles, is very much in the 
vein of recent writing on capability theory.  The appearance of this idea in the 
context of the case law of persons
80 indicates its potential, but also its limits.  It 
goes beyond the requirements of formal equality in insisting on the need for 
state action to remove the conditions which inhibit effective market 
participation.  At the same time, it is only within a relatively narrow and 
established legal framework that the idea, to date, has much purchase.  The 
Court’s approach is suggestive of the kind of reasoning which might be put to 





This paper has examined the concept of capability from an historical perspective 
in order to try to gain some traction on the issue of its usefulness for 
contemporary EU social law.  The idea has potential as a way of breaking out of 
the impasse established by neoliberal policies, which increasingly view social 
rights as a fetter on the growth and integration of markets.  Capability theory, in 
contrast, insists on paying regard to the institutional preconditions for the 
effective participation of individuals in market activities.  Contrary to 
neoliberalism, these are not limited to the provision, by private law, of 
contractual capacity or the right to hold property, but extend to collective 
mechanisms for the sharing and distribution of social risks arising from the 
operation of markets.  However, the example of the male breadwinner model 
offers an example of the urgent need to review and renew these mechanisms.  
The EU, which already recognises that social rights have a place within an 
integrated market order, is ideally placed to play a central role in this process.  It 
is disappointing, therefore, that the ‘learning process’ associated with the 
employment strategy has done more to endanger than to encourage institutional 
innovations of the kind needed to move this debate forward.  This should 




contested terrain, in which many different conceptions of the market order 
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